

# Do Conditional Cash Transfers Lead to Better Secondary Schools: Evidence from Jamaica's PATH

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
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- **Identification:** Exploit a discontinuity in eligibility scores for CCT
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- **Findings:** Focusing on Urban Children
- Boys:
  - 1 Student Aspirations
  - 2 **Increase in Test Scores**
  - 3 **Increase in Quality of Secondary School**
- Girls:
  - 1 Student Aspirations
  - 2 Test Scores
  - 3 ~~Quality of Secondary School~~

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- Missing mass just to left (treated) of eligibility threshold

**Figure 2 – Distribution of the PATH Proxy Means Test Score**



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
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- At some point HH become to obviously eligible.


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- However, “judgment calls” are more consistently shifted to the mass to the left of the threshold.

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  - **Concern:** Possible difference for households that were able to remain just to the left of the threshold?
    - Possibly more determined / resourceful / competent. Traits that could correlate with outcomes of interest.

- **Robustness Check:** Vary/narrow the bandwidth.
- Results for first stage/reduced form
  - First stage: Compliance and the PATH score. Looks very strong.
  - Reduced form: To demonstrate the “intent-to-treat” effect.
- More details on household income.
  - How big is the marginal payment relative to HH income?
  - Any measure of the true opportunity cost of having children continue in school?

# Possible Extentions

- **Enrollment:** Is there any way to disentangle difference between a missing match and dropout?
  - Only 74% of overall population continues to secondary school, I would assume this is higher for the population of the study.
  - Enrollment might be a more direct link to CCT? Mechanism from CCT to learning would have to be through attendance?
- HH Determines Program Status (Cluster at this level?)
  - Interesting to explore how access to CCT impact education for oldest/youngest, boys/girls, etc.
  - Does income transfer change the household optimal investment strategy? (Angrist et al., *AER* 2002)