

Comments on:
Deterrence & reciprocity effects on
tax compliance

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Were enforcement & reciprocity really more effective?

Small firms:	Peak effect (Aug 15)	Avg. effect (all periods)
Enforcement	-0.038**	-.016
Reciprocity 1	-0.034*	-.015
Reciprocity 2	-0.028	-.012
Tax morale	-0.022	-.013
Placebo	-0.031*	-.014

Questions on the specification

$$tax_bal_{it} = \alpha + \sum \beta_{it} TREAT_i * \gamma_t + \delta_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Why “tax_bal” not raw tax payments?
- Why T different Betas? (ANCOVA? Multiple comparisons corrections?)
- Treatment effects from May 30, before intervention?
- Why not use placebo treatment in triple-diff?

Mechanisms / Proving a (non-) result

- Claim 1: Tax morale letter ineffective.
- Claim 2: Raising tax morale ineffective.
 - Either beliefs about others' behavior don't matter much...
 - OR the letter failed to change recipients' beliefs.
 - Testable with additional survey data (or in lab?)